What were the consequences?

Labour migrants reach 86 % employment after five years. Refugees reach 15 % after two years and 58 % only after ten years. Source: Statistics Sweden STATIV.

Establishment time has not improved despite increased spending. The 2010 Establishment Mission has not shortened the average time to first job. Source: IFAU and the Swedish National Audit Office.

Foreign-born residents as a group contribute less than they cost during their first decades in Sweden. The size of the net cost depends strongly on ground for residence, age at arrival and education. Ruist 2015; Aldén & Hammarstedt 2019; ESO 2018:3.

Aggregate GDP has grown with the population, but GDP per capita has stagnated since 2018. The correlation is not purely migration — productivity and the employment gap both matter. Source: Statistics Sweden National Accounts.

133 of Sweden's 290 municipalities had a negative result in 2024. Municipalities with high refugee reception have on average lower tax capacity and higher welfare payments per inhabitant. Source: SKR and Statistics Sweden.

The share of welfare payments correlates strongly with the share of foreign-born in a municipality — but is not fully explained by it. Education, labour market and time in Sweden carry most of the effect. Source: Socialstyrelsen; SCB.

The share of pupils leaving Year 9 without upper-secondary eligibility was 16 % in 2024 — the highest level since measurement began. The gap between native and foreign background is large but narrows with years spent in Sweden. Source: Skolverket.

School segregation has increased since the 1992 free-school reform. Researchers agree on the increase; they disagree on how much of the outcome gap it explains. Source: IFAU, Skolverket, OECD.

The relative risk of being registered as a suspect is about 2.5× for foreign-born and 3.2× for native-born with two foreign-born parents. After controlling for age, sex and socioeconomic factors, about 1.6× and 2.0× remain. Source: Brå 2021:9.

Fatal shootings peaked at 63 in 2022 — the highest per-capita in the EU — and have since halved to 32 in 2024 and continued downwards in 2025. Bombings peaked at 149 detonations in 2023 with a new record in 2024, and have fallen sharply in the first half of 2026. Source: Police; Brå.

Whether this should be read as an integration crisis, a recruitment crisis in vulnerable areas, or an effect of the structure of the drug market is a political and analytical question where researchers disagree.

The number of vulnerable areas has been stable around 59–61 since 2017. The number of particularly vulnerable has fallen from 23 (2017) to 15 (2025) — partly through upgrading, partly because areas "step down" to risk area. Source: Swedish Police NOA.

Overcrowding is about four times higher in vulnerable areas than in the rest of the country. The share of children growing up in crowded housing affects school outcomes, health and crime risk. Source: Boverket; Public Health Agency.

The second generation consistently outperforms the first on school, employment and income — but does not reach the native background level. Employment is about 10 percentage points lower; median income about 14 % lower; welfare dependency nearly twice as high. Source: Statistics Sweden STATIV.

Convergence is stronger for pupils with parents from Europe and East Asia, weaker for pupils with parents from the Middle East and Africa. This holds after controlling for parental education. Source: Rooth & Ekberg, IFAU reports.

Whether the remaining gap is due to discrimination, cultural distance, housing segregation, the school choice system, or a combination — this is where researchers do not agree. This is the chapter's most important open question.